Archive | mayo, 2014

Sesión XXVI: A monographic event on philosophy of psychiatry and diagnostic categories

20 May

Hola a todo el mundo. Me complace anunciaros que, para compensar la ausencia de sesiones de los últimos meses, hemos preparado una sesión especial con un tema monográfico: la filosofía de la psiquiatría y las categorías biomédicas relacionadas. Y para ello contaremos con dos especialistas en la materia: Alba Amilburu (UPV) y Kathryn Tabb (U. Pittsburgh), que nos brindarán una sesión doble, y el correspondiente cara a cara. Todo ello el próximo miércoles 28 de mayo a las 11:00 en la sala 06 de la Facultad de Fiosofía de la UNED (Pº Senda del Rey 7), en colaboración organizativa con los Seminarios del Dpto. de Lógica, Historia y Fª de la Ciencia de la UNED. He aquí los resúmenes:

Alba Amilburu (Universidad del País Vasco), Grouping Practices from a “Naturalistic” Point of View: A Meta-Theoretical Comment

It is said (Boyd 1991, Reydon 2010) that the notion of ‘natural kind’ plays an important role in philosophy of science for understanding grouping practices, what science is and how it works because it allows and facilitates a comparison of different classificatory strategies. In order to investigate the contribution of this philosophical concept, we need first to clarify what makes a kind natural. In this paper I argue that the notion of “natural kind” is ambiguous: a fundamental disagreement concerns how philosophers understand the ideas of “natural”, “real” and “objective”. Thus, a meta-theoretical analysis –i.e., an interpretation of the different theoretical accounts of natural kinds that conform the current debate– is a necessary step to clarify the uses and meanings of the “natural kind” concept. I argue that this analysis explains in what sense the notion of “natural kind” is ambiguous, and it serves as a useful tool for understanding the relations, controversies, peculiarities and differences among theoretical approaches in the current philosophical discussion on grouping strategies and concepts.

Kathryn Tabb (University of Pittsburgh), After Psychiatric Kinds: Diagnostic Discrimination and Biomedical Progress

The failure of psychiatry to validate its diagnostic constructs is often attributed to the prioritizing of reliability over validity in the structure and content of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). Here I argue that in fact what has retarded biomedical approaches to psychopathology is unwarranted optimism about diagnostic discrimination: the assumption that the applicability of a given set of diagnostic criteria to a given set of patients make possible a substantive body of specific ampliative inferences about those patients. In fact, judgments about diagnostic discrimination in the biomedical research context are often a priori, ungrounded in clinical practice, and unsupported by external validators. I show how philosophers  have followed practitioners in ignoring the powerful influence that the DSM’s constructs have over research, and consider the Research Domain Criteria framework as a new paradigm for psychiatric research that solves some philosophical challenges while raising new ones.

 

diagnosis

Y si todo va bien, a la hora de comer habremos terminado y encontrado una mejor organización diagnóstica de nuestros problemas cognitivo-conductuales. Sean todos invitados y bienvenidos al fin de curso SFC.

¡Hasta el miércoles!

 

 

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